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  The government’s assumption that commercial speech restrictions should be judged 
by the same standard as time, place or manner restrictions, Gov. Rep. 3 (citing United States v. 
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993)), fails to accurately set forth the relevant burden of 
proof articulated in more recent commercial speech cases.  “The Central Hudson test is 
significantly stricter than the rational basis test,” and requires the government “to prove that 
the regulation ‘directly advances’ that interest and is ‘not more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.’”  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (citation 
omitted).  This means the government must “carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits 
associated with the burden on speech imposed,” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 
528 (2001), and if it could “achieve its interests in a manner that … restricts less speech, [it] 
must do so.”  W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 371.  Where the record before an agency fails to 
demonstrate that obvious and substantially less restrictive alternatives are inadequate, it has 
failed to meet its burden.  U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting FCC’s reliance on “common sense judgment based on experience” because “[t]he 
burden under the fourth prong of Central Hudson is significantly higher”).   
I. The DNCR Will Not Materially Advance The Government’s Interest 
 At oral argument the government repeated its claim that its principal estimate 
regarding the proportion of calls it expects the DNCR will block is based on the predictions 
of lost business put forward by the telemarketing industry – estimates that neither agency 
accepted.  See also Gov. Br. 35 n.9.  It also suggested that experience with Missouri law 
supports its claims and it continued to rely on data in H. Rep. 102-317.  But it is difficult to 
reconcile continued reliance on this 1991 data since the FCC based its NPRM on the need to 
 1
 account for “significant changes” in telemarketing since 1992.  FCC Order at 14017.  It is 
noteworthy that the evidence in the House Report persuaded Congress to require FCC 
investigation into whether additional authority was needed, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D), because 
it acknowledged that charitable or political calls can “in pockets of the country – represent as 
serious a problem as commercial solicitations.” 1  This suggests the Court should not rely on 
data from a particular state because of significant regional variations. 2  Here, however, the 
government actively avoided collecting new data on what types of calls are made, by whom, 
and the extent to which calls are welcome or unwanted.  See, e.g., FCC NPRM at 1748-49. 
 This lack of hard information lead the government to misread Discovery Network and 
Edge Broadcasting to suggest that a commercial speech regulation that reduces 3 to 4% of a 
given problem is “paltry” but that a solution that addresses 11% of the problem represents a 
“material advancement” of the government’s interest.  But this misreads both cases.  Rubin, 
Utah Licensed Beverage and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting could not have been decided as they 
                                       
1  H. Rep. 102-317 at 16-17.  It is impossible to know why Congress suggested this might 
be true only in “pockets” of the country since the House Report contained data on only 13 
states.  It also is significant that the House data relates only to complaints, which the FCC 
concluded was the type of data that should not form the basis for “revis[ing] or adopt[ing] 
new rules under the TCPA.”  FCC Order at 14140.  See infra note 7 (FCC’s recent action 
against AT&T shows high “false positive” rate for complaints). 
2  The claim that Missouri reduced calls by 70 to 80% came from a discussion at an FTC 
workshop focused on the established business relationship (“EBR”) exemption.  June 2002 
Tr. at 107-121. (Sup. App. 0763-77)  The context in which the claim was made raises the 
question whether it relates to a reduction in all calls or just commercial calls.  No data was 
presented to support the overall estimate which admittedly was based on “anecdotal 
information.”  Id. at 118-119. (Sup. App. 0774-75)  As part of this discussion, AARP 
testified that it had conducted a survey with the Missouri Attorney General’s office “which 
found that three-fourths of consumers do not believe that a business relationship exemption 
was justified.”  Id. at 119. (Sup. App. 0775) 
 2
 were if Central Hudson required the government to show only somewhat more than a “paltry” 
impact on the problem.  Like the situation here, each of these cases invalidated commercial 
speech regulations that were undermined by exemptions, and none of the cases attempted to 
quantify how much of the problem was affected by the exclusions.  Moreover, it is not the 
case, as suggested at oral argument, that where exemptions invalidate a commercial speech 
regime, only allowances for other commercial speech are relevant. 3
 The government mischaracterizes Appellees’ claims as involving only underinclusive-
ness, Gov. Rep. 2, 5, 9, 18, but the problem is not just that the DNCR blocks only some 
unwanted calls while allowing others; it is the lack of correlation between individual 
preferences and the categories it imposes.  See FTC Order at 4593 (discussing Information 
Policy Institute Study of consumer preferences).  The FTC even explained how a registry 
approach overblocks speech because consumers will register even if it means sacrificing calls 
they otherwise would permit, id. at 4636, while underblocking speech because the categories 
crafted by the government allow many unwelcome calls.  Id. at 4637, 4593 (finding 
consumers are annoyed regardless whether a call is commercial or charitable and adopting 
EBR exception though 60% of comments opposed it).  Yet even if the record supported the 
government’s assumption that people react more negatively to a ringing telephone when the 
                                       
3 See Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1068, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(exemptions included state public service messages promoting safe drinking and “infor-
mational materials” from hotels); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173, 179 (1999) (exemptions included allowances for “gift enterprises” or similar 
schemes by, inter alia, non-profit organizations, just as here exemptions include sales and 
solicitations by charities); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995) (exemptions 
included statements made to comply with federally required disclosures of alcohol content 
on wine labels and state-mandated disclosures for beer labels). 
 3
 purpose of the call is purely commercial, the DNCR’s exemptions do not hew to a straight 
commercial/noncommercial distinction: non-profit organizations can call numbers on the 
DNCR to sell goods or services to obtain proceeds used for charitable missions, while for-
profit entities cannot direct “image” advertising to DNCR registrants, even absent a sale.  
Similarly, companies having an EBR with DNCR registrants can call them but the 
company’s competitors cannot.  CompTel  Br. 3-6. 
II. The DNCR Is More Restrictive Than Necessary 
 Fortunately, more closely tailored solutions exist.  For example, the FTC explained 
that the company-specific approach provides a “direct correlation between the governmental 
interest and the regulatory means employed.”  FTC Order at 4636.  But the government 
concluded it could not rely on an appropriately tailored regulation that – unlike the DNCR – 
precisely matches consumer preferences, because of its assumption that the company-
specific rules had failed.  However, the record does not support this conclusion. 
 Burden on Speech.  The record is clear that the government failed to “carefully 
“calculate” the burden imposed by the DNCR on commercial speech.  FCC Order at 14039;  
FTC Order at 4631-32 (conclusory dismissals of evidence regarding adverse impact).  In 
addition, the DNCR virtually ensures restriction of far more speech than necessary because 
it allows anyone with an email address to use the Internet to place multiple telephone 
numbers – including those of other people – on the DNCR without their knowledge or 
 4
 approval. 4  At oral argument, the government acknowledged this problem, but asserted that 
procedures are in place to prevent one person from registering too many numbers.  
However, this does not address the inherent problem of “list pollution” that has been well 
documented. 5
 Narrow Tailoring.  Both in its papers and at oral argument the government 
contrasts the narrow tailoring requirement as discussed in Discovery Network where “Cincin-
nati failed even to consider means for advancing its aesthetic and safety concerns that would 
not have barred commercial speech,” Gov. Br. 47, with the current record where it asserts 
FTC and FCC enforcement experience justifies a more restrictive rule for commercial 
telemarketers.  But the record here is quite clear that the company-specific rules were never 
enforced by the agencies.  Pet. Br. 10-12.  In response to clear record evidence that the “do-
not-call” rules were not a priority and there was no tangible effort to enforce them, the 
government lists a few cases in a footnote.  Gov. Rep. 15 n.7.  But listing two FCC 
administrative letters (sent in the latter half of 2002) is not much to show for 10 years’ 
enforcement history, and the three cases involving private lawsuits are irrelevant to the 
agencies’ actions.  The two unpublished cases that the FTC claims to have brought rested 
                                       
4  FTC Order at 4639; Valentine & Kennelly Affidavits. (P.A. 0734-59)  Compare Rowan v. 
Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 730 & n.1 (1970) (regulation allows blocking of unwanted mail 
only for specific addressee and children under 19);  id. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
5  See DMA Fee at 13 (Sup. App. 0795); June 2002 Tr. at 143 (staff statement that FTC 
“did not … initially suggest Internet registration [due to] difficulty of obtaining adequate 
verification”). (Sup. App. 0779)  Cf. http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/030917dncstates.pdf 
(data showing three-quarters of registrations directly received are via Internet). 
 5
 almost entirely on fraud allegations. 6  Most significantly, the FCC announced on November 
3, 2003, a proposed $780,000 forfeiture on AT&T for violations of the company-specific 
rules, but in doing so confirmed that “[t]his is the Commission’s first major Do-Not-Call enforcement 
action.” 7
 Given this enforcement history, it should come as no surprise that the vast majority 
of people were entirely ignorant of the company-specific rules.  Pet. Br. 9-10 (citing, inter alia, 
AARP study in FTC record that less than 5% in nationwide survey knew rules existed).  The 
actual record thus undermines the government’s sweeping assertion that the “overwhelming 
response to the establishment of the registry indicates[ ] millions of consumers have found 
[company-specific] rules inadequate to protect their privacy.”  Gov. Rep. 10.  In fact, what 
the response really shows is that the public was glad the government finally had adopted 
some rules, since most were ignorant that any previous regulations existed.  This overlooks 
                                       
6  FTC v. Epic Resorts LLC, No. 6:00CV105ORL-19-C (M.D. Fla.) was settled without 
any finding of liability. (Sup. App. 0817-34)  The thrust of the FTC’s complaint alleged 
fraudulent practices, and only one minor count out of seven claimed any “do-not-call” 
violation.  (Sup. App. 801-811)  The only other case the government cites for FTC actions, 
FTC v. 1st Financial Solutions, No. 01-C-8790 (N.D. Ill.), likewise included “do-not-call” 
violations only as an afterthought in a larger fraud prosecution.  The FTC characterized the 
case as involving “[d]eceptive practices in violation of Section 5 and the Telemarketing Sales 
Rule” without reference to “do-not-call” issues (Sup. App. 0850) and listed the case in its 
“Telemarketing Fraud Enforcement Action Announcements.”  (Sup. App. 0851) 
7  News Release, Nov. 3, 2003 (emphasis added) (Sup. App. 0856)  The Notice of 
Apparent Liability also demonstrates the hazard of counting raw numbers of complaints to 
show the magnitude of the “do-not-call” problem.  The FCC investigated 360 complaints 
against AT&T, determined that only 142 (40%) warranted further inquiry, and ultimately 
found only 78 to be actionable (involving 29 complainants).  Thus, the false positive rate was 
approximately 78% even if all 78 of the complaints ultimately are deemed valid after AT&T 
has an opportunity to respond.  AT&T Corp., FCC 03-267, ¶ 3 (rel. Nov. 3, 2003) (“AT&T 
NAL”). (Sup. App. 0859) 
 6
 entirely evidence in the record that education makes such rules more effective.  See DNC-Tr. 
at 92, 188, 212 (P.A. 0576, 0600, 0604); RR-Tr. at 406. (P.A. 0640)  It also ignores case law 
indicating that providing information about a given problem, and enforcing existing laws, are 
obvious less restrictive alternatives in any Central Hudson analysis.  See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 507 (1996); Revo v. Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 936 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 Lacking any true enforcement experience, the government now claims the company-
specific rules are inherently flawed “even if it were always possible to make a do-not-call 
request and even if such request were promptly honored” because “the consumer must 
respond to thousands of calls from an ever-growing number of solicitors.”  Gov. Rep. 10-
11.  But this cannot be reconciled with the government’s claim that company-specific rules 
will be effective for noncommercial and EBR calls in the absence of an enforcement history 
that proves otherwise.  Gov. Br. 12.  The government’s claim that noncommercial callers 
have more of an incentive to obey the company-specific rules is unsupported by the record 
and is illogical. 8  Nor can the Court credit the government’s purported distinction that some 
noncommercial entities created voluntary no-call lists, since the commercial telemarketing 
industry pioneered the concept.  Compare Gov. Br. 49 with Pet. Br. 18.  Reference to the sheer 
number of potential calls (in reliance on the number of businesses that make telemarketing 
                                       
8  FTC Order at 4637.  The FTC’s conclusion on this point is based on the assertions of 
the Hudson Bay Company.  But the EBR exemption is predicated on the assumption that 
businesses want to maintain good relations with customers to promote ongoing 
relationships, and the incentives are no different for new competitive businesses.  See generally 
CompTel Br.  If anything, callers who just want to “deliver a message” may have less 
incentive to worry about consumer reactions.  
 7
 calls) likewise does not provide a distinction, since all of those businesses have established 
relationships, and there is no shortage of nonprofit organizations.  
 The government’s assertion that consumers would have to make “thousands” of 
requests is typical of the hyperbole that infects this case, but is undermined by the record.  
Indeed, the commenters that supplied specific data about their actual experience by keeping 
logs of their telemarketing calls confirmed that the number of calls was far from 
overwhelming.  For example, the government cites the comments of Diana Mey, “a 
consumer [who] taped and logged all the telemarketing calls she received over a two-year 
period.”  Gov. Rep. 12.  However, review of her “log” indicated that she received about 105 
calls in 28 months, or just under one per week, including hang-ups, EBR and 
noncommercial calls.  (Sup. App. 0866-99)  This is very similar to the experience of Joe 
Shields, an official of Private Citizen, who submitted a detailed log of 212 telephone solici-
tations from August 1999 to August 2002.  (Sup. App. at 0900-15)  This translates into about 
six calls per month, or just under 1.36 calls per week from all sources, including political and 
charitable organizations.  Assuming the total number of telemarketing calls claimed by the 
government (16 billion per year) is correct, the experience of these two commenters is 
consistent with the expected average, given the number of phone lines in the U.S. 9  
                                       
 
9  See Pet. Br. 14-15 & n17.  While the government cites a few comments submitted by 
individuals who claim to have received 10- 20 calls per day, many are described as 
abandoned calls, which are addressed by other rules.  See Gov. Rep. 11 n.5 (citing West 
(“Somedays I have over 20 calls” including those where “no one speaks of a second or two 
[so] I know it is a computer call”), Durle (“receive[s] up to 20 calls per day where many were 
just a machine dialing and hanging up”), Johnson (“receiving up to 10 calls per day from 
telemarketers [that left] answering machine … filled with hang-up[s]”), Meyer (“receives up 
to 10 … calls per day” that are “sometimes computer calls”) (Sup. App. 0916-19)).  Indeed, 
 8
  To be sure, both of these commenters supported creation of the DNCR and were 
cited in the final orders of both agencies.  See FCC Order 14117, 14121 (citing Shields); FTC 
Order at 4629, 4646, 4655-56 (citing Mey).  However, what is vital for present purposes are 
not the policy preferences of the various commenters, but the facts submitted on the record.  
10  And while these and other commenters described what appear to be some apparent rule 
violations, the record provides no reason to believe that the violations would have occurred 
under a scenario in which the agencies are enforcing their rules. 11  The FTC noted that 
when it enforced its rules against fraud – which present many of the same practical 
difficulties – occurrence of fraud dropped dramatically.  DNC-Tr. at 10. (P.A. 0571)   
 Where the agencies (and the comments they rely upon) describe particular reasons for 
the rules’ presumed failure, those problems are addressed by rule changes that do not restrict 
speech as does the DNCR.  Callers that hang up before company-specific requests can be 
made or that refuse to log requests, Gov. Rep. 12, 14 (citing Mey, Burkart de Varona, 
ACUTA), now must comply with rules precluding interference with “do-not-call” rights.  
16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii).  Where there have been difficulties identifying the entity calling in 
order to make a company-specific request or lodge a complaint, Gov. Rep. 13-14 (citing 
                                       
 
the FCC reported that 41% of telemarketing calls are not completed, which suggests much 
of the problem will be addressed by abandoned call rules.  See FCC Order at 14021 n.28. 
10  For example, the government cited comments of Anne Gardner for the proposition 
that the company-specific rules do not work, Gov. Rep. 12 n.6, when her actual statement 
was “[t]elling them not to call again does seem to work, but it would be good if there was a 
central do-not-call list they had to consult first.”  (Sup. App. 0920) 
11  See AT&T NAL (proposing $780,000 forfeiture).  All of the purported rule violations 
described by the commenters presumably would be addressed by the agencies’ new focus on 
 9
 ACUTA, Burkart), new Caller ID rules (and enforcement of disclosure requirements) 
address the problem.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(6).  And where 
commenters reported continued calls even after a company-specific request is lodged, Gov. 
Rep. 12-13 & n.12 (citing Mey, Anderson, Harper, Heagy, Nova, Nurik, Gardner, Gilchrist), 
new rules requiring companies to honor company-specific requests in 30 days or less will 
reduce or eliminate such post-request calls.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3). 
 Claims that the rules are deficient because it is difficult to sign up or that consumers 
have no way of verifying their requests also could have been addressed by additional rule 
changes suggested by ATA and others.  But the agencies rejected changes that would have 
remedied these problems, including additional means of lodging and confirming company-
specific requests. 12  Because the government must give the less intrusive alternatives it 
adopted a chance to work, and explain why those it rejected would fail, the DNCR is overly 
restrictive.  E.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758-759 
(1996).  
III. The DNCR Fees Are Unconstitutional 
 Admissions in the FTC Fee Order and at argument that proceeds from DNCR registry 
fees are being used for purposes other than enforcing the “do-not-call” rules are fatal to any 
constitutional defense of the fees.  The FTC acknowledged it will use the fees for enforce-
                                       
 
enforcement.  E.g., Gov. Rep. 12-13 & n.12 (citing NAAG, Anderson, Harper, Heagy, Nova, 
Nurik, Gardner, Gilchrist). 
12  See Pet. Br. 47.  The government’s claim that industry opposed such measures is 
untrue.  Compare Gov. Rep. 15 with ATA Reply Comments at 19 (supporting toll-free and 
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 ment of the TSR’s fraud rules, including infrastructure upgrades (e.g., the Consumer Sentinel 
database).  The law is clear that when the government imposes fees on protected speech, as 
does the DNCR, it “may charge no more than the amount needed to cover administrative 
costs” for the specific regulation at issue, and it is “prohibited from raising revenue under 
the guise of defraying its administrative costs.”  Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 
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web-based company-specific registration). (P.A. 0271)  Company-specific requests placed by 
800 number or online could ensure adequate verification, unlike the DNCR procedures. 
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